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IN DEFENSE OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: 
THE DOMINATION OF TITLE VII BY THE 
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 
CHUCK HENSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Congress gave the moral principle of “equality” a 
foundation in national law.1  Taken as a statement of Title VII’s 
purpose, such purpose anchors the persistent belief that 
Congress intended Title VII as a radical and permanent 
departure from the past.  De jure and de facto discrimination and 
the rule of employment-at-will represent the past.  Title VII 
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Missouri School of Law; Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution, 
University of Missouri School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 
1990; B.A., Yale University, 1987. The author would like to give a special thank you 
to Professor William R. Corbett for his thoughtful commentary and whose article, 
The “Fall” of Summers, The Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating Subordination 
of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from 
McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996), helped inspire this Article. 
Additionally, the author gives many thanks for the encouragement, guidance, and 
editorial advice of Dean Rafael Gely, Professor Miriam Cherry, Professor David 
Mitchell, Dean Rigel Oliveri, and Professor Joshua D. Hawley; thanks for the 
research assistance of Scott Smithson and Chris Lesinski; and thanks to the John 
W. Cowden Faculty Research Fellowship and the W. Dudley McCarter Faculty 
Research Fellowship for supporting this endeavor. Finally, the author thanks Renee 
Elaine Henson for her constant support and Paris Olivia Henson for giving him a 
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1 Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now 
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 (1994) (“Title VII molded the basic 
moral principle of equal treatment into a national policy to eliminate employment 
discrimination.”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The 
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 
203, 210 (1993) (“In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress stressed that 
equal employment opportunity is a basic right in this country. The legislature noted 
that the other civil rights the Act guaranteed would be meaningless without the 
right to ‘gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them.’ ” (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964))). 
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represents the achievement, or at a minimum, the path to the 
colorblind meritocracy envisioned at the time of its creation by 
dealing with chronic issues of unemployment, underemployment, 
segregation in employment, and unequal pay.2  Title VII, 
however, has not served this purpose.3  Those who believe that 
Congress had such a purpose for Title VII blame McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green4 (“McDonnell Douglas II”) and the 
Supreme Court for emasculating Title VII in disparate treatment 
cases.5  McDonnell Douglas II, however, is not responsible for the 
2 Referring to the proposed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, key legislators 
recognized that voting rights, school desegregation, and the desegregation of public 
accommodations had little meaning in the absence of jobs: 
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty 
stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if 
gainful employment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a 
restaurant or hotel is a shallow victory where one’s pockets are empty. The 
principle of equal treatment under law can have little meaning if in 
practice its benefits are denied the citizen. 
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26 (1963). Unemployment, employment by 
occupation, and wage statistics showed nonwhite unemployment at more than twice 
the rate of white unemployment. Id. at 27–28. 
3 For example, in 1979, the continuing employment disparity led the United 
States Supreme Court to describe the purpose of Title VII as opening to blacks 
previously foreclosed employment opportunities, which was a foundation to the 
Court’s decision to permit short-term private affirmative action in United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). The Court in Weber 
specifically noted that the unemployment rates had not changed since Title VII 
became law in 1964: “The problem that Congress addressed in 1964 remains with us. 
In 1962, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white rate.” Id. 
at 204 n.4. “In 1978, the black unemployment rate was 129% higher.” Id. 
Historically, black unemployment rates have continued to be twice as high as white 
unemployment rates. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Data Retrieval: Labor Force Statistics 
(CPS), BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm (check 
box for “unemployment rate” under “not seasonally adjusted” column for the “White” 
and “Black or African American” subcategories; then select “Retrieve data”) (last 
modified July 8, 2015). 
4 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
5 The difficulty in proving disparate treatment is seen as a problem of 
interpretation rather than a fundamental problem with Title VII’s structure. See 
also Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and 
Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial 
Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1487–88 (1997) (“Most recently, in 1992, we 
demonstrated how the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, had 
significantly weakened Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by construing 
procedural rules in a consistently pro-defendant manner.” (footnote omitted)); 
Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 315 (2010) (“Plaintiffs have 
a hard row to hoe in proving unlawful discriminatory bias. Without the smoking gun 
document, the blatant biased statement, or other direct evidence, plaintiffs must 
rely on a variety of factual circumstances to weave a story that convinces the fact-
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weakness of disparate treatment claims.  McDonnell Douglas II 
is the consequence of the course set by Title VII’s authors: the 
Eighty-eighth Congress.  What has gone unacknowledged if not 
unrecognized is the domination of the at-will employment 
doctrine (“Doctrine”) over the creation of Title VII by the Eighty-
eighth Congress and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title 
VII.  Despite the rhetoric,6 because of the Doctrine’s influence, 
Title VII did not supplant employment-at-will; Title VII was 
conceived in the shadow of employment-at-will.  By design, Title 
VII is just an exception to the Doctrine.  The Court’s 
interpretation of Title VII conforms to its design.  Thus, Title VII 
finder that an employer’s actions constitute unlawful discrimination.”). See generally 
William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 
(2009); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 
(2007); Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell 
Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 743, 746 (2006); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An 
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every 
Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).  
6 See generally Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality 
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997). Professor Selmi has observed 
that the Supreme Court cannot see anything but the kind of discrimination that 
brought on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 284, 335 (“Once the signs 
denominating ‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for 
the Court to understand what legal problem remained.”). Both Title VII’s legislative 
history and the Court’s pronouncements about Title VII’s purpose are rich sources of 
rhetoric. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant 
purpose of the title, of course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”);  Ford 
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (“The ‘primary objective’ of Title VII is 
to bring employment discrimination to an end . . . .”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (“The primary purpose of Title VII was to 
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory 
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens.” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“The emphasis of both the 
language and the legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination 
in employment . . . .”); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 
(1976) (“The Act prohibits All racial discrimination in employment, without 
exception for any group of particular employees . . . .” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. 
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1975) (“It creates statutory rights 
against invidious discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive 
scheme for the vindication of those rights.”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment 
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green (McDonnell Douglas II), 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“Title VII tolerates no 
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).  
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has performed its intended and less heroic purpose of driving 
only the worst forms of discrimination out of the workplace or 
underground. 
The purpose of this Article is to describe the actual 
relationship between the Doctrine and Title VII as implemented 
in the Court’s disparate treatment decisions.  Title VII and the 
Doctrine are not separate forces warring with each other.  The 
at-will employment doctrine guided the Court’s Title VII 
disparate treatment jurisprudence, giving the maximum possible 
latitude to employers because that was the Eighty-eighth 
Congress’s intent. 
Part I of this Article describes the at-will employment 
doctrine as part of the constitutionally protected freedom of 
contract.7  This Article argues that the Doctrine’s amazing power 
derives in part from its longevity but mainly from its status as a 
constitutionally protected freedom.8  As to the latter point, this 
Article argues that a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions, Lochner 
v. New York,9 Adair v. United States,10 and Coppage v. Kansas,11 
emphasized the inviolability of the Doctrine and that future 
efforts to create new rights for employees necessarily resulted in 
weak exceptions to the Doctrine.12  With due deference to the  
 
 
 
7 As described in Part I, the Eighty-eighth Congress and the Court’s statements 
and actions support the proposition that the at-will doctrine is a form of freedom of 
contract protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which provided the 
context for the crafting of a statutory limitation on that freedom in the form of Title 
VII. 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
10 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
11 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
12 The fact that the Lochner decision’s hands-off stance to social legislation that 
impacts laissez faire economics has been repudiated does not appear to have 
impacted the point of Lochner: Individual liberty is a paramount constitutional 
concern encompassing all of the elements of the Doctrine. See generally Lochner, 198 
U.S. 45. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the majority made a specific point that 
the legislation it approved—Washington state’s minimum-wage law for women—
impacted only what would be paid, not who would be hired or fired. 300 U.S. 379, 
396–97 (1937) (“This statute does not compel anybody to pay anything. It simply 
forbids employment at rates below those fixed as the minimum requirement of 
health and right living.” (internal quotation mark omitted)). The more intimate 
personal decision of who would be hired, who would be fired, and for what reasons 
remained wholly intact. 
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repudiation of the principle of unfettered freedom of contract by 
the Court’s 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,13 
employment-at-will remained untouched. 
In Part II, this Article addresses the Doctrine’s successful 
encounter with the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  In 
Part II, this Article argues that the Doctrine remained largely 
intact because of its dominant position vis-à-vis the new rights 
conferred by the NLRA.  Moreover, the encounter between the 
Doctrine and the NLRA informed Title VII’s creation and 
interpretation fifty years later.  The earliest versions of Title VII 
were meant to copy all of the features of the NLRA, including a 
quasi-judicial body with broad investigative and enforcement 
powers.  Because of the encounter between the Doctrine and the 
NLRA, Title VII was passed with a powerless Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 
In Part III, this Article follows the Doctrine’s dominant role 
in the creation of Title VII and the Court’s disparate treatment 
jurisprudence.  The focus of Part III is the McDonnell Douglas II 
decision’s key role in perpetuating employment at-will’s 
domination of Title VII.  This Article argues that what has been 
described as an “escalating subordination of federal employment 
discrimination law to employment at will”14 does not fully credit 
the Doctrine’s dominant position as the context for the creation 
and interpretation of federal employment discrimination law.  
The Doctrine’s dominance accounts for how little Title VII could 
achieve in light of the Doctrine’s impact on the Eighty-eighth  
 
 
13 300 U.S. 379. 
14 William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, The Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the 
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to 
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 311 
(1996) [hereinafter Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers]. Professor Corbett, for example, 
argues that the turning point in favor of at-will happened after McDonnell Douglas 
II. Thereafter, there has been an escalation of subordination. William R. Corbett, Of 
Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time To Jettison 
McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 361, 366–67 (1998) [hereinafter 
Corbett, Of Babies]; Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra, at 332 (“The Supreme 
Court’s subordination of employment discrimination law and its policies to the 
employment-at-will doctrine can be traced to its Furnco opinion in 1978.”). This 
Article argues that McDonnell Douglas II was the point where the Court first 
described Title VII’s subordinate position to the Doctrine and that rather than an 
escalation, there has been clarification. See infra Part III.A. 
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Congress and how the Court, starting with McDonnell Douglas 
II, acted to preserve the broadest latitude for employer  
decision-making. 
I. AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT—DOCTRINE OF POWER 
The Doctrine permits an employer to fire an employee at any 
time “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally 
wrong, without being . . . guilty of [a] legal wrong.”15  The 
Doctrine is more than a bland description of the employer’s right 
to fire an employee.  At-will employment is a doctrine of power.16  
The Doctrine draws its strength from several sources: its 
longevity,17 its role in a capitalist economy,18 and its relationship  
 
 
 
 
15 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884). 
16 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 307 (describing at-will 
employment as “the ultimate manifestation” of power, property, and prerogative). 
17 The issue of when at-will became a legal baseline in the American view of the 
relationship between employer and employee has been the subject of some dispute. 
Some prominent scholarship points to Horace G. Wood’s 1877 treatise as the origin 
of the American doctrine and the genesis of its adoption as American law—thus 
“Wood’s Rule.” Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125 (1976); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, 
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974). Other 
scholarship questions whether to credit Wood with announcing a new rule. Compare 
Shapiro & Tune, supra (“H.G. Wood . . . formulated the employment at will rule in 
his 1877 treatise on master-servant relationships . . . .”), with Mayer G. Freed & 
Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (“Horace Wood did not make up the rule of employment at will. 
He just told it like it was.”). Other scholars, most notably Professor Deborah A. 
Ballam, have convincingly shown that the idea of the terminability of employment-
at-will has always been part of American law. Deborah A. Ballam, The Development 
of the Employment At Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the 
Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 86 (1995) 
(responding to Professor Feinman’s conclusion that at-will became the rule in New 
York in the late 1890s and stating that “New York always followed the employment 
at will doctrine”); Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding 
Employment-at-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 91, 94 (1996) (“[A]bsent a contract to the contrary, employers in this country have 
always had the ability to terminate employees at will.”). 
18 The economic rationale for the Doctrine has been consistent: “[T]ermination 
at will is the law’s development of a fundamental principle of the economy.” 
Feinman, supra note 17, at 118. 
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to freedom.19  Of these sources of power, the Doctrine, as a 
constitutionally protected freedom of contract, provides a direct 
link to Title VII’s creators.20 
Of the “freedoms” in American law, a central freedom is 
individual autonomy.  In contrasting types of freedom, for 
example, Eric Foner juxtaposes the autonomy of the individual, 
liberal freedom with Republican freedom.21  Liberal freedom as 
personal autonomy shields economic activity from governmental 
interference.22  Republican freedom represents willingness to 
subordinate personal autonomy to the public good.23  According to 
Foner, “Individual self-fulfillment, unimpeded by government, 
would become a central element of American freedom.”24  This 
form of freedom manifested in the workplace in the mid-1800s as 
factories and unskilled labor supplanted small workshops and 
skilled artisans.  Individuals exercised their freedom by entering 
into voluntary agreements to work for employers.25  Employers 
exercised their freedom by agreeing to the employment and 
setting its terms.26 
19 ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 8 (2006) (“The public good 
was less an ideal to be consciously pursued by government than the outcome of free 
individuals’ pursuit of their myriad private ambitions.”) (describing the distinction 
between competing ideologies of freedom at the time of the American Revolution, 
thereby highlighting what would become the dominant concept of freedom). 
20 Senators debating Title VII in April 1964 specifically raised an employer’s 
right to hire and fire at-will as a reason not to pass Title VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 
7253 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“The bill is designed to compel employers to 
hire nonwhites in specific cases, whether they wish to hire them or not; is it not?”); 
id. at 7257 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I want those who are engaged in business to 
be allowed to determine whom they shall employ. . . . I believe in free enterprise—
not bureaucratic control of business. The pending bill would remove the power from 
employers to hire, promote, and discharge their own employees.”); id. at 7267 
(statement of Sen. Morton) (“The right to fire, it seems to me, is an important 
right.”) (noting that the abridgment of that right because individuals thought they 
had been discriminated against would lead to the downfall of American industry). 
21 FONER, supra note 19. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 7–8. 
24 Id. at 20. Professor Richard A. Epstein makes the same argument: Personal 
autonomy equals freedom. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992) (“An antidiscrimination law 
is the antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that allows all persons to do 
business with whomever they please for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at 
all.”). 
25 FONER, supra note 19, at 59. 
26 Id. 
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As a central element of American freedom, between 1890 and 
1910, it has been said that “at-will” began to take on the name of 
“freedom of contract.”27  The Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. 
New York28 set the stage for employers by invalidating a New 
York labor law that prohibited employers of bakers from 
requiring bakers to work more than sixty hours per week on the 
grounds that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
liberty interest of freedom of contract.29  The Lochner Court 
determined that “[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering 
with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by 
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”30  
Indeed, the Lochner majority strongly signaled its disagreement 
with the idea of any interference in the terms on which people 
might agree to purchase and sell labor.31 
The Lochner Court also crafted its decision as if employers 
and employees were equal bargaining partners.32  The Court 
maintained this pretense of equality in two Lochner-era labor 
cases: Adair v. United States33 and Coppage v. Kansas.34  In 
Adair, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company fired a 
locomotive fireman solely because of his union membership.  The 
termination involved a federal law applicable to railway 
employers prohibiting them from discriminating against 
employees because of union membership.35  In other words, the 
statute created a protected class based on voluntary union 
27 Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the 
United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 116 (1982). 
28 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
29 Id. at 52–53 (“The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty 
protected by [the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . .”). 
30 Id. at 57. 
31 Id. at 63 (“This interference on the part of the legislatures of the several 
states with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the 
increase.”); id. at 61 (“Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours 
in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere 
meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual . . . .”). As Justice 
Holmes’s dissent recognized, Lochner went well beyond working-hour limits for 
bakers in establishing laissez-faire as the economic theory of the Constitution. Id. at 
75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 61 (majority opinion) (“The act is not, within any fair meaning of the 
term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both 
employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as 
they may think best . . . .”). 
33 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
34 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
35 Adair, 208 U.S. at 167–69. 
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membership and curtailed the employer’s right to terminate 
employment because of union membership.  The Adair Court 
recognized that freedom of contract was a liberty interest under 
the Fifth Amendment and held the federal law prohibiting the 
termination of an employee because of union membership 
unconstitutional because of the at-will nature of the 
employment.36  In doing so, the Court gave the following 
description of the nature of the at-will employment relationship: 
[I]t is not within the functions of government . . . to compel any 
person, in the course of his business and against his will, to 
accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel 
any person, against his will, to perform personal services for 
another.  The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms 
as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of 
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he 
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. . . . In 
all such particulars the employer and the employee have 
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality 
is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no 
government can legally justify in a free land.37 
In 1915, the Coppage decision amplified the Adair holding by 
rendering unconstitutional state legislation that impinged on at-
will prerogatives when the issue involved union membership.38  
Moreover, the Coppage Court elevated at-will employment to the 
highest rank of constitutional liberty and property interests.39  In 
Coppage, the employer fired an employee because he refused to 
sign a contract to leave his union.40  The State of Kansas 
prosecuted the termination under a state statute making it 
unlawful for any employer “to coerce, require, demand, or 
influence any person or persons to enter into any agreement, 
either written or verbal, not to join or become or remain a 
member of any labor organization or association, as a condition of 
such person or persons securing employment, or 
36 Id. at 175–76. 
37 Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added). Equally noteworthy, given the protections 
that were ultimately granted on the basis of voluntary or involuntary class 
membership in the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII, the Adair Court 
implied that class-based legislation was iniquitous and likely never within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 179–80. 
38 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 26. 
39 Id. at 14. 
40 Id. at 7. 
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continuing . . . employment.”41  The Court held the state law 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.42 
The most striking feature of Coppage is the extent to which 
the Court elevated at-will employment in the spectrum of 
constitutional freedoms and the complete denigration of the 
existence of any constitutional protection for membership in a 
union.  In defense of the at-will principle the Court declared: 
The principle is fundamental and vital.  Included in the right of 
personal liberty and the right of private property—partaking of 
the nature of each—is the right to make contracts for the 
acquisition of property.  Chief among such contracts is that of 
personal employment, by which labor and other services are 
exchanged for money or other forms of property.  If this right be 
struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial 
impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional 
sense.  The right is as essential to the laborer as to the 
capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of 
persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, 
save by working for money.43 
As to any protection that might be afforded union 
membership, the Court determined, “if freedom of contract is to 
be preserved, the employer must be left at liberty to decide for 
himself whether [union] membership by his employee is 
consistent with the satisfactory performance of the duties of the 
employment.”44  Indeed, true freedom of contract required 
employers to know through open and frank dealings whether an 
employee belonged to a union,45 and for an employer to demand 
that an employee abjure unionism as a condition of employment 
“is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional 
freedom.”46 
41 Id. at 6. 
42 See id. at 13. 
43 Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. at 19. 
45 Id. at 20 (“And the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to 
procure employment from an unwilling employer . . . .”). 
46 Id. at 21. The Coppage Court’s discussion of the employer’s right to know 
whom he employed deserves some emphasis. In 1915, it was perfectly appropriate 
for an employer to ask about union involvement and fire an employee for refusing to 
quit the union. In other words, disloyalty to the employer fit within the fair exercise 
of the employer’s freedom because of the at-will doctrine. In 1973, the Court in 
McDonnell Douglas II discussed disloyalty as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for refusing to hire Green. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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Although the Court’s 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish diluted the full strength of Lochnerian freedom of 
contract that flows through Adair and Coppage, it left the most 
intimate aspects of the decision to hire and fire wholly intact.  
Repudiating but not overruling Lochner, the West Coast Hotel 
Court declared that freedom of contract was not unfettered.47  On 
the other hand, in declaring that a minimum wage law was not 
an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, the Court clarified 
that setting a minimum wage was not an infringement on the 
right to hire or fire at-will:  “This statute does not compel 
anybody to pay anything.”48  The statute only set the minimum 
wage if a willing buyer and seller of labor made an agreement.49  
This language paraphrases the Coppage Court’s declaration that 
“the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to 
procure employment from an unwilling employer.”50  After West 
Coast Hotel, the ability to hire and fire at will remained 
constitutionally protected. 
II. THE DOCTRINE ENCOUNTERS THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT—A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR TITLE VII 
The New Deal’s National Labor Relations Act51 (“NLRA”) 
challenged the complete domination of the constitutional right of 
freedom of contract in the form of the at-will employment 
doctrine.52  The NLRA’s apparent onesidedness seemed to 
repudiate the principles of Adair and Coppage by creating an 
imbalance in the complete equality of right to set the terms of a 
labor bargain.53  Regardless of whether Congress intended the 
complete repudiation of Adair and Coppage,54 the 1937 NLRB v. 
47 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1937). 
48 Id. at 396 (quoting Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
49 Id. 
50 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 20. 
51 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
52 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 318–20. 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 36–43. 
54 JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 44–
66 (1983) (discussing how the NLRA’s apparent onesidedness in favor of employees 
was balanced by certain limitations on protections for concerted activities, 
particularly the subjectivity which Congress invited the courts to employ in 
construing section 7 which made striking a legal form of bargaining over the terms 
of employment). 
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Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.55 and the 1938 NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph Co.56 decisions showed that the NLRA was 
not really that much of a challenge for the Doctrine.57 
In Jones, a divided Court upheld the NLRA as a proper 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.58  However, 
Jones left Adair and Coppage in place.59  Consistent with the 
West Coast Hotel decision, according to the Jones Court, the 
character of the NLRA, which did not attempt to compel 
agreements between employers and employees, made Adair and 
Coppage inapposite.  In words that the Eighty-eighth Congress 
would echo almost fifty years later in defining the scope of the 
EEOC’s authority under Title VII,60 the Jones Court reassured 
employers of the limits of the NLRA and of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”): 
The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of 
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.  The 
employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or 
coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and 
representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled 
to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of 
discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than 
such intimidation and coercion.61 
Jones, on its face, guarantees not only the continued vitality 
of at-will, but promises that the Court would take a protectionist 
view of the at-will power. 
55 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
56 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
57 Both Professor Corbett and Professor Atleson discuss the tension between the 
at-will doctrine and the NLRA in decisions starting with Mackay Radio in 1938, but 
neither focuses on the Court’s 1937 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. decision as the 
roadmap for what was to come. 
58 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 31–43. 
59 Id. at 45. 
60 See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963) (“Similarly, management 
prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent 
possible. Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be 
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in 
discrimination practices.”). 
61 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). The Jones 
Court also seemed to foreshadow and highlight its view of the narrow scope of the 
NLRA when it added, “It would seem that when employers freely recognize the right 
of their employees to their own organizations and their unrestricted right of 
representation there will be much less occasion for controversy in respect to the free 
and appropriate exercise of the right of selection and discharge.” Id. at 46. 
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A year later, in Mackay Radio, the Court honored its 
promise.62  The Court protected the employer’s right of selection 
and discharge by authorizing employers to offer permanent 
employment to strike-breakers, those who the NLRB could not 
require an employer to discharge in favor of returning economic 
strikers.63  The key language identifying the Court’s basic 
assumption about the NLRA is the Court’s statement that, 
although the NLRA prohibits interference with the right to 
strike, “it does not follow that an employer . . . has lost the right 
to protect and continue his business by supplying places left 
vacant by strikers.”64 
The employer’s “right to protect and continue his business” 
assumes an employer specific set of rights, which runs directly 
from Lochner, Adair, and Coppage.  Although the rights may be 
camouflaged or appear under an alias,65 the disguises of these 
employer-specific rights are reasonably penetrable.  As to the 
scope of the right, it is so broad and powerful that no federal 
enactment can truly interrupt “the normal exercise of the right of 
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.”66  
Accordingly, rather than assuming that a new federal “right” 
requires the given context to make an accommodating 
adjustment, the reverse is true.  New “right” is by nature fragile 
and the new “right” will be accommodated to give the existing 
constitutional freedom the broadest possible scope.  The NLRA 
did not really challenge existing management prerogatives, and, 
as this Article argues below, by design, neither did Title VII. 
III. AT-WILL’S DOMINATION OF TITLE VII 
Title VII disparate-treatment jurisprudence favors the at-
will employment principle of broad employer discretion.  So, 
rather than a remedial statute, broadly construed to advance 
equality, Title VII is most accurately seen as a limited incursion 
on employer’s discretion.  Short of direct evidence of 
discrimination, “the normal exercise of the right of the employer 
62 See generally NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
63 Id. at 345–46. It is now axiomatic that Mackay Radio effectively distorted, if 
not destroyed, the NLRA’s protection of the right to strike by depriving the economic 
strike of any potency. ATLESON, supra note 54, at 19. 
64 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added). 
65 Id.; Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 308. 
66 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46. 
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to select its employees or to discharge them”67 has not changed.  
In reality, Title VII was never more than “just another tort 
exception to employment at will.”68 
A. At-Will’s Domination of Title VII—Legislative History 
The Eighty-eighth Congress set Title VII’s initial limits as an 
exception to the Doctrine in 1964.  Most scholarship overlooks 
this fact, or fails to recognize its significance.69  The holes in 
scholarship may also be “[b]ecause employment at will often is 
referred to by one of its many aliases, such as management 
prerogatives, it has not always been recognized.”70  Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that Congress subordinated Title VII to at-will 
employment by specific intent ab initio. 
The Eighty-eighth Congress literally stole the Court’s lines 
from Jones, promising to protect “the normal exercise of the right 
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.”71  
Accordingly, as Title VII left the House of Representatives for the 
Senate in late 1963, Congress emphasized the limits on the 
EEOC and the scope of Title VII: 
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its 
activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with 
mathematical certainty.  In this regard, nothing in the title 
permits a person to demand employment.  Of greater 
importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued 
existence if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon 
employers or labor unions.  Similarly, management 
prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to 
67 Id. at 45. 
68 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 311. Title VII’s status as an 
icon of the civil rights era seems to be responsible for the fact that very few 
acknowledge Title VII for what it is. Those who realize that McDonnell Douglas II is 
correct do so with anguish. See generally McGinley, supra note 1, at 231. 
69 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 312–14 (“[T]he hoary 
doctrine is on the offensive against federal employment discrimination law, rapidly 
regaining whatever territory was once taken from it by the federal statutes.”) 
(taking the perspective that the at-will doctrine is uncommonly resilient in the face 
of laws like Title VII and wondering at the source of the doctrine’s strength). 
Professor Corbett is not commenting on the impact of at-will on the abysmal success 
rates of race and national origin discrimination cases under Title VII. Rather, the 
issue is more general, and Professor Corbett points out, but does not really define, 
the borders of the territory Title VII conquered by at-will. 
70 Id. at 308. 
71 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46; see also supra note 60 
and accompanying text. 
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the greatest extent possible.  Internal affairs of employers and 
labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the 
limited extent that correction is required in discrimination 
practices.72 
This description of the primacy of at-will employment 
captures the narrow scope Congress intended for legitimate 
EEOC action and the narrow scope of Title VII itself.  The use of 
well-known aliases, “management prerogatives,” and “internal 
affairs of employers” affirmed at-will as the dominant context in 
which Title VII should function.  Should there be confusion about 
the “abuse” Congress intended Title VII to correct, “to the limited 
extent that correction is required” Congress defined “abuse” as 
“the most serious type[] of discrimination.”73  This language is the 
better source for an accurate statement of purpose for Title VII; 
there is no rhetoric or wishful thinking—both of which, overtime, 
have superimposed a purpose unrelated to the mandate Title 
VII’s designers imbedded in its structure.  The purpose of Title 
72 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
73 Id. at 18, 29. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no preamble stating its 
purpose, and neither do any of its component Titles. A statement of the purpose and 
content of the legislation that would become the Act comes from House Report 914, 
November 20, 1963 on House Resolution 7152. According to the report, “The bill, as 
amended, is designed primarily to protect and provide more effective means to 
enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 
16. The General Statement to the report describes the House Report: 
H.R. 7152 . . . is designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of 
discrimination on a nationwide basis. It is general in application and 
national in scope.  
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and 
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. 
There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by 
the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome 
problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local 
resolution of other forms of discrimination.  
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation 
which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious 
types of discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve in a 
number of related areas. . . . [i]t would prohibit discrimination in 
employment . . . . 
Id. at 18. The report’s section-by-section analysis of Title VII states: “The purpose of 
this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial 
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin.” Id. at 26. See generally Selmi, supra note 6, at 284, 335. Professor Selmi has 
observed that the Supreme Court cannot see anything but the kind of discrimination 
that brought on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. (“Once the signs denominating 
‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for the Court to 
understand what legal problem remained.”). 
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VII is not the eradication of employment discrimination in 
general.  Title VII’s purpose is the eradication of the most serious 
discrimination and the retention of employer discretion.  Having 
outlined this purpose for Title VII, Congress assured that Title 
VII would remain true to its purpose by limiting Title VII’s 
enforcement agency, the EEOC, and by failing to deal with the 
issue of causation in any way that would have created a truly 
new “right” beyond the Doctrine’s reach.74 
The form and function of the NLRB influenced Congress to 
minimize the power of the EEOC as an enforcement agency.  For 
example, the initial proposal for what became Title VII was 
practically a carbon copy of the NLRA.75  It included a quasi-
judicial administrative body, like the NLRB, with power to 
adjudicate claims and enforce compliance.76  Apparently mindful 
of arguments that the NLRB’s powers unconstitutionally 
transgressed the Seventh Amendment,77 however, legislators 
early and successfully advocated for a powerless EEOC.78 
74 The author picked the form of the EEOC and the issue of causation as the 
issues that most readily expose the historical continuity of the at-will doctrine’s 
influence on federal fair employment practices legislation. Given constraints of 
space, the author chose not to discuss the other manifestations of congressional 
intent to limit Title VII’s impact on traditional management prerogatives and union 
freedoms such as the right to test, the preservation of union seniority, the 
prohibition against quotas, and the decision to limit Title VII to future wrongs. For a 
more detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Chuck Henson, Title VII 
Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41 
(2012). 
75 Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 85 (1964). 
76 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
77 In Jones, one of the challenges to the constitutionality of the NLRA was that 
the NLRB deprived employers of the right to a jury trial because the challenged 
NLRB order not only reinstated employees, but also granted them back pay. NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). The Jones Court reasoned 
that because the back pay award was incident to equitable relief the Seventh 
Amendment did not apply. Id. at 48–49. 
78 The author quotes legislative history when describing how the legislature 
rejected an EEOC that operated like the NLRB: 
The historic safeguard of trial before an impartial judiciary would be 
abandoned in this bill by the majority in favor of hearings before a newly 
created NLRB-type administrative tribunal, with only a limited right of 
review in a court of appeals. It is unfortunate that the committee in its zeal 
to protect one civil right has seen fit, unnecessarily, to cast aside other 
fundamental and well-established rights which are at least of equal 
importance. 
Henson, supra note 74, at 71 n.145 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We regard 
the modern development of trial by administrative tribunal as a threat to the 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 90 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 90 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_HENSON 4/6/2016  4:07 PM 
2015] IN DEFENSE OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 567 
As to creating a new “right” beyond the Doctrine’s reach, 
Congress ultimately did nothing.  Accepting the premise that 
“any or no reason” defines the Doctrine’s reach for hiring, 
promoting, and firing, a new “right” of equal or greater power 
needed to either limit the Doctrine’s application to white men or 
replace the Doctrine altogether if Title VII’s purpose was to 
eradicate employment discrimination in general.  Exempting all 
but white males from the Doctrine was never proposed as a 
solution,79 nor was replacing the Doctrine altogether. 
liberties of every citizen. It is a reactionary device in the truest sense of that word.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By the time Title VII left the House of 
Representatives for the Senate in late 1963, the House had already emasculated the 
EEOC, limiting its role to investigation and conciliation. Discussing the reasons for 
depriving the EEOC of quasi-judicial powers, the representatives noted that their 
version of Title VII gave employers and unions “a fairer forum to establish 
innocence” with the federal judiciary as the final arbiter of discrimination. H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). The choice between a quasi-judicial EEOC and the 
federal judiciary has a peculiar significance in the protection of at-will’s primacy. A 
crusading EEOC could have ignored the common law given a broad mandate to 
eliminate employment discrimination. On the other hand, for judges, at-will was the 
context in which their decisions were regularly made. Accordingly, the designation of 
courts as the final authority on the existence of discrimination emphasized at-will’s 
primacy under the alias of “a fairer forum.” See id. 
79 Such a solution ran contrary to the idea of a colorblind meritocracy and would 
have called for the kinds of special treatment or favoritism for blacks that legislators 
expressly disavowed to preserve the ability to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into 
law. See Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2769 (1963) (noting that, when questioned about preferential 
treatment and quotas, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy specifically testified 
that there was no intent “to grant any preferential treatment to Negroes”); 110 
CONG. REC. 7253 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“The bill is designed to compel 
employers to hire nonwhites in specific cases, whether they wish to hire them or not; 
is it not?”); id. (statement of Sen. Case) (“It does not require anybody to hire a 
particular individual. It does not require anybody to hire someone who cannot do the 
job necessary.”); id. at 7267 (statement of Sen. Ellender) (“It is obvious from this case 
and all that has gone before it that the Negroes are not interested in equal 
employment opportunity, but in effect desire preferred treatment.”). As the Senate 
prepared to vote on the final version of H.R. 7152, which would become the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Senator Williams caused his correspondence with one of the chief 
proponents of H.R. 7152, Senator Dirksen, to be printed in the Congressional 
Record. Id. at 14,329. Senator Williams asked Senator Dirksen three questions about 
whether Title VII required quotas. Senator Dirksen responded, “The Senate 
substitute bill expressly provides that an employer does not have to maintain any 
employment ratio, regardless of the racial ration in the community.” Id. (“Under the 
Senate substitute bill an employer is not required to hire any person who is less 
qualified than other job applicants. . . . The Senate substitute bill does not affect the 
right of an employer to discharge inefficient employees, regardless of their race and 
of the effect of the discharge on the racial balance in his employment.”); id. at 12,723 
(noting that Senator Humphrey’s remarks concerning persistent claims that Title 
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Prior to 1963, Congress attempted one large-scale federal 
effort at creating a new employment right.  That effort was the 
NLRA.  The NLRA, however, did not replace the Doctrine.  
According to the Jones Court, at-will remained entirely whole 
unless and until the NLRB proved that the employer’s decision 
was actually a pretext for intimidation or coercion related to the 
exercise of an employee’s rights under the NLRA.80  The Doctrine, 
therefore, remained the same with the minor addition of “except” 
where the NLRB proved that “any reason or no reason” was 
actually hiding an anti-union motivation.  What the NLRA did 
provide for was the exercise of the freedom of contract where 
parties of more or less equal power could bargain to replace the 
Doctrine.  That unions could convince management to agree to 
termination “for cause” and give up the right to termination for 
“any or no reason” was a creature of the voluntary agreement 
between management and labor under the NLRA’s shadow, not a 
statutory carve-out or displacement of the Doctrine.81 
To the degree that the NLRA was an example of how 
Congress might have created a specific replacement for the 
Doctrine, the Eighty-eighth Congress followed the NLRA’s 
example and left the Doctrine intact despite two opportunities to 
limit the Doctrine’s impact on Title VII.  One opportunity to limit 
at-will’s reach would have been defining discrimination in the 
text of the statute to require objective grounds for employment 
decisions.  The second opportunity to limit the Doctrine would 
have been to describe causation so that every employment 
decision, from hiring to firing, had to be justified as being made 
for cause. 
A definition of discrimination that would have made an 
employer liable for “nonobjective behavior” was proposed: 
A simple definition is sufficient.  Let us refer to employment 
discrimination as any nonobjective behavior on the part of an 
employer toward an employee or potential employee, which 
reflects some intuitive negative evaluation (prejudice) of the  
 
 
VII required racial balancing or preferential treatment had been addressed by the 
inclusion of a specific statement in Title VII that it did not require quotas or 
preferences). 
80 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46. 
81 Id. at 45 (“The [NLRA] does not compel agreements between employers and 
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.”). 
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employee’s race to the extent that the employer, when 
confronted with a manpower need, will either not use the 
employee, underutilize him and/or undercompensate him.82 
Congress did not adopt this definition. 
The Eighty-eighth Congress also had the opportunity to limit 
the Doctrine when for cause became a part of the debate over 
how an applicant or employee might successfully achieve a job, 
promotion, reinstatement, and back pay, hereinafter “meaningful 
relief,” in compensation for unlawful discrimination.  To 
paraphrase, under an early version of section 706(g), a claimant 
could not receive meaningful relief if the adverse employment 
decision was “for any reason other than discrimination on 
account of race.”83  In a subsequent iteration, section 706(g) read 
that no court could award meaningful relief if the adverse 
employment decision was “for cause.”84  In its final iteration in 
the House, one of Title VII’s sponsors amended section 706(g) to 
replace “cause” with “any reason other than discrimination on 
account of race.”85  In other words, an employer avoids an award 
of meaningful relief by having “any reason” for an adverse 
employment decision where a claimant cannot prove the decision 
was “on account of race.”86  This conclusion fits within Title VII’s 
82 Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor 
of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 88th Cong. 203–04 (1963) (testimony of Walter B. 
Lewis, Director, Job Development, Washington Urban League). 
83 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., REP. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964 at 86 (Comm. Print 1963). 
84 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 12 (1963). 
85 110 CONG. REC. 2567 (1964). Representative Celler explained the amendment 
was made “to specify cause” to assure that a court “cannot find any violation of the 
act which is based on facts other—and I emphasize ‘other’—than discrimination on 
the grounds of race.” Id. 
86 The paucity of legislative history on this particular language in H.R. 7251 has 
been cause for confusion. The language could be read to mean that unless claimants 
proved that race, for example, was the only reason for the adverse decision, they 
would receive no meaningful relief. Once H.R. 7152 reached the Senate, an effort 
was made to clarify that a section 703 unfair employment practice arose “solely 
because of” a proscribed characteristic. 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–38 (1964). Senator 
McClellan of Arkansas proposed adding the language “solely” so that section 703 
would not “be a dragnet, a catchall, to leave something uncertain for a court to 
interpret.” Id. at 13,837 (internal quotation marks omitted). In support, Senator 
Long of Louisiana explained: 
I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would want to insist on 
leaving out the word ‘solely,’ because my impression was that if it were 
desired to hire someone because he was a brother-in-law or a first cousin, a 
person could not complain that he failed to get the job because of his race. 
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purpose as described by Congress—the elimination of the worst 
kinds of discrimination and the preservation of the maximum 
extent of management discretion in decision making. 
B. The Doctrine’s Domination of Title VII—Griggs and 
McDonnell Douglas II 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided its first disparate 
treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.87  In that 
case, the Court created the infamous burden shifting analysis.  
With minimum factual allegations, the prima facie case, a 
claimant could establish a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination subject to an employer’s assertion of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.88  
In light of the history of the Doctrine’s dominant position, 
express legislative intent to maintain that dominance, and 
specific statutory language prohibiting the award of meaningful 
relief where race is not the only reason for an adverse decision, 
the burden shifting analysis and its results were inevitable. 
 
Id. Senator Lausche from Ohio agreed with Senator Long that the addition of the 
word solely was a mere clarification that the phrase “because of” really meant “only 
because of.” See id. at 13,837–38.  Because the Senate did not add the word solely to 
Title VII, it has been argued that sole causation could not have been Congress’s 
intent. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII 
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 296–97 (1982). That 
argument, however, is based on the distinction between what the author calls 
meaningful relief, also known as affirmative relief, and injunctive or negative relief, 
or what the author calls meaningless relief: No injunctive relief under Title VII in 
this context would ever pay the rent or put food on the table. Nevertheless, proof in a 
mixed motives case would allow for injunctive relief; thus, the absence of sole 
causation was never a bar to all relief. Although the Senate rejected “solely because 
of,” no Senator ever told the Senator from Louisiana that he misunderstood Title 
VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–38 (1964). In fact, amendments in the Senate 
actually diminished Title VII’s ability to contest the at-will doctrine’s domination of 
the employment relationship. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The 
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1471–72 (2003) 
(concluding that the primary work of the pivotal legislators in the Senate was to 
blunt the impact of Title VII on the north, where their constituencies dominated job 
opportunities, both management and labor, and discrimination was de facto rather 
than de jure). 
87 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
88 Id. at 802–03. 
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Nevertheless, McDonnell Douglas II has been and continues 
to be the subject of intense criticism.  Among other reasons,89 
academics and jurists fault the Court for creating the burden-
shifting device when there was no need.90  This criticism ignores 
how the lower courts actually implemented their understanding 
of Title VII before 1973.  They were already engaging in a 
method of analysis similar to burden shifting by giving due 
emphasis to the reasons employers voiced to defend their 
employment decisions and weighing the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case in light of the employer’s rationale.91  The criticism also 
89 Other principal criticisms of McDonnell Douglas II are that it diverts courts 
from the issue of discrimination, that there was no statutory basis for the Court’s 
interpretation of Title VII and that it sets up an illusory distinction between direct 
and indirect evidence which makes disparate treatment cases unnecessarily difficult 
to prove. See Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell 
Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 743, 762 (2006); Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 503, 519–24 (2007). 
90 This argument might be summarized as asserting that the parties, the 
district courts, and the circuit courts were doing just fine trying disparate treatment 
cases without the burden shifting format. 
91 See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 
1972) (“In discrimination cases the law with respect to burden of proof is wellsettled. 
The plaintiff is required only to make out a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the 
existence of any disparities.”). Hodgson, an age-discrimination case, was unique in 
that the employer asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire 
as affirmative defenses. See also Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th 
Cir. 1970) (“To rebut testimony from specific black applicants for employment 
introduced by [the plaintiff], the Company produced evidence tending to show valid 
business reasons supporting its refusal to hire each of them.”); Aros v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (concerning a defendant 
rebutting a prima facie case of sex discrimination based on hair length by asserting 
that failure to hire long-haired student interns was based on poor overall grooming 
and slack performance and defendant’s decision to phase out the student program 
for business reasons); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 
1970) (“After the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence has made a prima facie case of 
discrimination, it was in order to look to the defendant for an explanation.”). 
Admittedly, the early cases demonstrate a certain amount of confusion. In some 
cases, plaintiffs attempt to prove that race, age, or gender was the sole cause of the 
adverse employment action. Courts responded by finding that a proscribed 
characteristic only needed to be the principal cause. There appear to be no cases 
where a defendant formally assumed a burden of proof for their legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason, except where, possibly in confusion, a defendant pled its 
reasons as an affirmative defense. See Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 822 (concerning an 
employer asserting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, that the job was too 
strenuous, and that the plaintiff agreed that the plaintiff was not qualified because 
the job was too strenuous, as affirmative defenses). Accordingly, as with the modern 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, courts merely required the defendant to 
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completely ignores the impact of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.92 on 
disparate treatment cases.  The Griggs decision interrupted the 
normal development of Title VII as a limited exception to at-will 
employment in disparate treatment cases.  The reaction to 
Griggs in the lower courts required the Court’s McDonnell 
Douglas II decision to realign disparate treatment jurisprudence 
with congressional intent and specific statutory language. 
1. Any or No Reason—Disparate Treatment Before Griggs 
In a number of pre-1973 disparate treatment cases,93 lower 
courts highlighted Title VII’s limited power to circumscribe 
employer decision-making:  “It must be remembered that so far 
as the Civil Rights Act goes, the employer may discharge or 
refuse to reemploy for any reason, except discrimination or 
because of practices made unlawful under Title VII.”94  At-will 
was present under the alias of “for any reason.”  Reasons which 
defendants asserted as not discriminatory included nonviolent 
unlawful protest against an employer,95 “inability” to get along 
with others,96 “lax attitude” toward work,97 reliance on bad 
respond to the plaintiff’s case based on better access to the reasons for adverse 
employment action. Id. (“Once the plaintiff has made out his prima facie case we 
look to the defendant for an explanation since he is in a position to know whether he 
failed to hire a person for reasons which would exonerate him.”); Gates, 326 F. Supp. 
at 399 (“After the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence has made a prima facie case of 
discrimination, it was in order to look to the defendant for an explanation. A 
defendant in these cases knows whether or not it failed to hire a person for reasons 
which would exonerate the defendant under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g).”); Marquez v. 
Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.10 (8th Cir. 1971) (“It is obvious 
that plaintiff was refused, denied, reemployment because of her civil rights activity. 
The record reveals no other possible motive. The refusal of the Board to specify is 
silent witness to the discrimination.” (quoting Williams v. Sumter Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
255 F. Supp. 397, 403 (D.S.C. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
92 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
93 The group of cases includes those under Title VII for race, national origin, and 
gender discrimination, and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967. 
94 Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Mo. 1970) 
(emphasis added); see also Barnes v. Lerner Shops of Tex., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 617, 
622 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
95 McDonnell-Douglas, 318 F. Supp. at 850. 
96 Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622 (“It is apparent from the record that defendant’s 
reasons for discharging plaintiff were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff’s 
inability to get along with her fellow employees and because of the lax attitude 
which she demonstrated in carrying out her duties.”); see also Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co., 
332 F. Supp. 424, 435 (D. Utah 1971) (“Defendant characterizes the [evidence of 
friction with subordinates and supervisors] as the culmination of many problems 
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references from prior employers,98 and a policy of hiring only 
internal candidates.99  Courts recognized that these kinds of 
reasons for adverse employment action contained a level of 
subjectivity which might provide a safe harbor for discriminatory 
animus.100  Consequently, and descriptive of the strength of at-
will, no claimant successfully argued that subjectivity standing 
by itself was grounds for invalidating an employer’s arguably 
subjective rationale for an adverse employment decision.101 
The outcome of asserting these traditional at-will grounds 
for adverse employment action depended on the strength of the 
claimant’s case in light of the employer’s reason.102  In some cases 
employers prevailed.103  In some cases employers failed.  They 
failed, not because their at-will reasons were questioned in some 
general sense, but because it was clear that the reason given was 
false or pretextual.104  Had this method of decision making 
with plaintiff and a clear indication of sufficient inability to get along with others as 
to justify her termination.”). 
97 Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622; see also Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 
421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970). 
98 Parham, 433 F.2d at 428 (“Nothing in the record indicates that the 
[defendant’s] background investigation of [the plaintiff] was anything other than a 
good faith effort to explore his prior employment experience.”). 
99 Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1970). 
100 In McDonnell Douglas I, for example, the Eighth Circuit specifically 
commented on subjectivity with reference to McDonnell Douglas’s stated reasons for 
refusing to rehire Green. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (McDonnell Douglas I) (“Our prior decisions make clear that, in cases 
presenting questions of discriminatory hiring practices, employment decisions based 
on subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges 
of discrimination.”). In Parham, the defendant relied on negative references from 
prior employers. In approving the finding that failing the background check provided 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to reject plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that the EEOC’s investigatory report in the case “questioned the objectivity of the 
recommendation from [a prior employer], noting that it may have reflected racial 
bias.” Parham, 433 F.2d at 428 n.6. 
101 Parham, 433 F.2d at 428; McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) 
(“The [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the rebuttal weight to which 
[McDonnell Douglas’s] reasons were entitled.”). 
102 Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622 (“It is apparent from the record that defendant’s 
reasons for discharging plaintiff were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff’s 
inability to get along with her fellow employees . . . . The burden of proving reasons 
apart from these was on the plaintiff. This she failed to do.”). 
103 Id.; see also Parham, 433 F.2d at 428; Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 
F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
104 In Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court acknowledged that a policy of 
only hiring internally “does not violate [Title VII].” 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 
1970). Yet, given the fact that the employer advertised openings outside of the 
company and filled an opening with a white internal hire whose “background was 
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continued an uninterrupted evolution, the Court would not have 
been required to put its imprimatur on burden shifting and the 
continuing vitality of at-will when it did.  There was, however, an 
interruption: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.105 
The need for Supreme Court intervention arose in 1973 
because of how lower courts reacted to Griggs.106  In establishing 
disparate impact as a viable cause of action under Title VII, the 
Griggs Court focused on the need for job related testing and 
policies and burdened the employer with showing business 
necessity for those tests and policies.107  The decision seemed to 
authorize the transformation of disparate treatment in that, 
according to the Court, “Congress has placed on the employer the 
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question.”108  This 
declaration contains two concepts anathema to employment-at-
will by (1) providing an objective basis for an employment 
decision and (2) shifting the burden to the employer to prove that 
objective basis.  The following Section describes the attempt to 
invoke Griggs in disparate treatment cases. 
conspicuously unimpressive in comparison with that of the [black] plaintiff,” the 
plaintiff prevailed. Id. at 398. In Tidwell v. American Oil Co., the court did not 
question the validity of an employer’s ability to terminate for failure to get along 
with others, or the basic proposition that a termination demonstrably carried out 
under standard operating procedure would negate an inference of discrimination. 
332 F. Supp. 424, 435 (D. Utah 1971). The court found, however, that the employer 
hired the plaintiff to get a job done without regard to getting along with her 
subordinates and her termination “was [not] such a routine firing.” Id. 
105 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
106 Griggs dealt with the impact of facially neutral job qualification policies, 
including educational requirements and job testing, in the specific context of a 
southern employer with a long history of segregating its black employees into the 
lowest paying menial jobs. Within that context, the Court pronounced that 
employment policies, specifically job testing, measure a person’s ability to do a job 
rather than measuring the person. Id. at 436. According to the Griggs Court, Title 
VII disallowed those “employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job 
capability.” Id. at 432. In the context of job testing, the Court observed: “The Act 
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id. at 431. The last sentence of this footnote 
may be important enough to add to the body of the text. Effectively, it explains the 
caveat that disparate treatment carves out of the at-will doctrine. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 432. 
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2. Nullification of “Any or No Reason”—Disparate Treatment 
Under Griggs 
Although the Griggs Court never explicitly contrasted 
“objective” with “subjective” reasoning for employment decisions, 
lower courts appear to have focused on Griggs’ coded description 
of objectivity: that employment procedures have a “manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.”109  Lower courts, 
already sensitized to the issue of subjectivity in employer 
decision making,110 took the “manifest relationship” requirement 
as their definition of “objective.”  These courts also fixed on the 
words “employment practices” and “employment procedures” and 
expanded them beyond the Griggs disparate impact context.  
Thus, in disparate treatment cases, any standard company policy 
or procedure on hiring and promotion was now subject to 
challenge as insufficiently objective.  Courts, particularly the 
Eighth Circuit, seemed to want employers to justify the existence  
 
109 See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972). In 
Reid, a religious discrimination case, at issue was a company policy that required all 
employees to be available to work on Saturdays. Reid, a black Seventh-Day 
Adventist, refused to work on Saturday because of his religion. Although the case 
deals with the impact of the recent incorporation of the concept of religious 
accommodation and the employer’s affirmative defense into Title VII’s text through 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701(j), 86 
Stat. 103, the decision emphasizes Griggs as the force behind the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision to remand the case on the issue of reasonable accommodation. Id. In other 
words, given the specific language in Title VII, there was no need for the Sixth 
Circuit to rely on Griggs. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Sixth 
Circuit believed that Griggs set a new global standard for employer decision making. 
Thus, the majority opinion equates the Griggs Court’s definition of business 
necessity with the statutory requirement of a reasonable religious accommodation, 
such that the business necessity for a policy informed the issue of reasonable 
accommodation. Id. Without establishing business necessity for the policy, there 
could be no argument for failing to make a reasonable accommodation. Id. If the 
policy did not pass the Griggs business necessity test, a failure to accommodate 
amounted to religious discrimination. In fear that the district court missed the point, 
a concurrence clarified: 
To uphold such a policy and requirement the trial court must find that the 
employer has sustained his burden of demonstrating that such policy and 
practice is necessitated by the requirements of the employer’s business and 
find further that such policy and practice is applied equally to all 
employees. 
Id. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring). As with the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit 
takes the Griggs Court’s business necessity holding completely out of the disparate 
impact context. 
110 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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and application of their policies in ways that, contrary to Title 
VII’s legislative history and design, threatened to undermine the 
scope and force of the Doctrine. 
Immediately on the heels of Griggs, the Eighth Circuit 
decided the disparate treatment case Marquez v. Omaha District 
Sale Office, Ford Division of Ford Motor Co.111  Marquez claimed 
that Ford had failed to promote him for fifteen years because of 
his national origin.112  Ford asserted its nationwide policy that 
required Marquez, a grade-six manager, to have grade-seven 
management-time to qualify for promotion to a grade-nine 
management position.  113  Marquez had not been a grade-seven 
manager.114  The trial court determined that, within the scope of 
the time covered by his EEOC charge, there was no evidence of 
discrimination.115  There being nothing objectionable about Ford’s 
policy; Marquez’s only evidence of discrimination consisted of the 
fact that he was the only minority employee and that, although 
qualified, he had not been promoted to grade seven.116  There was 
no evidence that Ford promoted someone less qualified over 
Marquez.117 
111 Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971). The 
Court decided Griggs on March 8, 1971. See 401 U.S. 424. The Eighth Circuit 
decided Marquez on March 31, 1971. 440 F.2d 1157. 
112 Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 313 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 (D. Neb. 
1970). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1406 (“Under these circumstances, where plaintiff because of his 
present lack of training is ineligible for a position and where there is absolutely no 
evidence that this present requirement of experience . . . is foreseeably 
discriminatory, it is the decision of the Court that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state 
a cause for relief.”). 
116 Id. at 1406. 
117 A concern existed about the perpetuation of the historical impacts of 
discrimination in company employment policies. Griggs, from one perspective, 
represents the strongest move by the Court to ratify the belief that Title VII, as a 
purely prospective measure, did too little to compensate for the obvious continuing 
impacts of historical discrimination. In what would be known after Griggs as 
disparate impact, at least one court before Griggs questioned the viability of facially 
nondiscriminatory policies that continued to exclude blacks. In Gates v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., a black woman alleged disparate treatment in Georgia-Pacific’s failure 
to hire her for a position in the advertising department. Georgia-Pacific filled three 
of four slots with white internal hires, one of whom “had no academic preparation for 
a career in accounting.” 326 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D. Or. 1970). In contrast, Mrs. Gates 
was “academically the best prepared of any of the persons interviewed.” Id. When 
Georgia-Pacific asserted a company policy of preferring internal candidates, the 
court responded: 
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Relying on its interpretation of Griggs, the Eighth Circuit 
ruled in favor of Marquez.118  Out of context, the Eighth Circuit 
cited Griggs for the proposition that Title VII allowed for 
remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination.119  This 
allowed the Eighth Circuit to revive Marquez’s claim in that he, 
like the plaintiffs in Griggs, had been “frozen” in place.120  The 
mere fact that the plaintiff, as the only minority employee in the 
district, had not been promoted in fifteen years became prima 
facie proof of discrimination.121  The Eighth Circuit deemed 
Ford’s promotion policy, standing alone, an insufficient 
legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason.122  Ford’s policy 
only explained the job requirements.123  The Eighth Circuit 
required Ford to explain why it had not allowed Marquez to meet 
the job requirements by promoting him to grade seven,124 to 
which Ford offered no explanation. 
One year later, the Eighth Circuit decided Green v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp.125 (“McDonnell Douglas I”) and created 
a rough draft of the burden-shifting analysis.126  Although short-
Such a policy, if it does not result in unlawful employment practices, does 
not violate the statute. However, this defendant has few, if any, Negro 
accountants or accounting clerks at the entry levels. A company policy of 
recruiting [from within] would result in de facto exclusion of Negroes from 
the better jobs whether the policy is intended to have that result or not. 
Id. at 399. 
118 Marquez, 440 F.2d at 1163. 
119 Id. at 1160. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1159. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1162. 
125 McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972). 
126 Id. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in McDonnell Douglas I represented such a 
dramatic statement against the at-will doctrine making it easy to misplace the link 
to Marquez. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas I builds on the groundwork the Eighth 
Circuit laid in Marquez. In Marquez, the Eighth Circuit refused to accept the mere 
existence of a facially neutral policy that resulted in Marquez being “frozen” in place 
and promotable. Marquez, 440 F.2d at 1160. Interstitially, this refusal represents 
dissatisfaction with the alleged neutrality of employer decision making. It also 
reflects the tension between the continued vitality of the Doctrine in the face of the 
Griggs Court’s conclusion that Title VII contained a policy to remove unnecessary 
roadblocks to equal employment opportunity. In McDonnell Douglas I, the majority 
resolved this tension against the Doctrine by requiring employers to prove a 
substantial relationship between adverse employment decisions and the actual job 
requirements. McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 344. Judge Lay, concurring, 
condemned the at-will doctrine in his homily on the evils of subjectivity: 
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lived, standing alone, the Eighth Circuit’s McDonnell Douglas I 
decision represented Title VII’s triumph over the at-will 
employment doctrine.  Reminding readers that the Eighth 
Circuit stood against subjectivity, the court stated, “employment 
decisions based on subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry 
little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.”127  The court 
specifically made objectivity the standard for employer decision 
making.128  The Eighth Circuit based this conclusion squarely on 
the Griggs holding.  “If an employment practice which operates to 
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”129  The Eighth Circuit 
also seemed to require an employer to prove an absence of 
discrimination, similar to the “business necessity” affirmative 
defense created in Griggs.130  Thus, after a plaintiff presents a 
prima facie case of discrimination, “the burden passes to the 
employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the 
reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of 
the job.”131  The Eighth Circuit married these elements into an 
Blind acceptance of any non-discriminatory reason offered by an employer 
in a fair employment case would always preclude correction of any 
discriminatory practices otherwise existing. It has generally been said that 
an employer may refuse to hire or decide to fire any employee for any 
reason he chooses. Civil rights legislation and case law dealing with 
discriminatory employment practices have added modification to these 
principles. Discriminatory motives even though they constitute only a 
partial basis for an employer’s refusal to hire are not sanctioned. 
Id. at 345–46 (Lay, J., concurring). Marquez also shows the Eighth Circuit 
demanding an employer to explain the nondiscriminatory basis for the result in 
Marquez. In McDonnell Douglas I, the Eighth Circuit amplified this demand to a 
specific requirement that “the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship 
between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the 
job.” Id. at 344. 
127 Id. at 343. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
130 Id. at 344; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
131 Id. In response to a request for rehearing and a very strong dissent, the 
majority replaced this language with: “However, an applicant’s past participation in 
unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant’s 
lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer.” Id. at 353. 
Nevertheless, the revised majority decision retained the language that really 
threatened an employer’s ability to rely on non-job-related reasons for adverse 
employment action: “Our prior decisions make clear that, in cases presenting 
questions of discriminatory hiring practices, employment decisions based on 
subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges of 
discrimination.” Id. at 352. 
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easy-to-prove prima facie case.  Accordingly, once a claimant 
proved that he was black, qualified for the job opening, and 
denied a job which remained open or occupied by a white person, 
an employer’s burden became proving the absence of 
discrimination in the same employment decision.132  The Eighth 
Circuit effectively rewrote Title VII.  It adopted a definition of 
discrimination analogous to the one Congress rejected and 
burdened the employer with proving reasons asserted for any 
adverse decision. 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision plainly contradicts 
congressional agreement that an employer never needs to prove 
the absence of discrimination, but that the claimant bears that 
burden.133  None of the interested parties, however, took this 
position.  Rather, the simplicity of the prima facie case, the 
apparent burdening of the employer with an affirmative defense, 
and the emphasis on objective job-related reasons for adverse 
employment action drove McDonnell Douglas’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court.134  In short, McDonnell Douglas believed that the 
decision effectively nullified the employer’s right to make 
subjective hiring decisions.135  Here, where “subjectivity” is the 
code word for the Doctrine, the Eighth Circuit’s decision nullified 
that as well. 
3. Any or No Reason—McDonnell Douglas II Returns Disparate 
Treatment to Its Intended Course 
The Eighth Circuit’s nullification of at-will employment was 
the issue confronting the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
v. Green.136  The Court responded by specifically reviving and 
132 Id. at 344. 
133 110 CONG. REC. 12,723–24 (1964). 
134 See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
135 McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 343. 
136 McDonnell Douglas presented the question as follows: “In Civil Rights cases 
involving allegedly discriminatory acts, should the defendant be precluded from 
offering subjective evidence to explain his motivation for those acts?” Brief for 
Petitioner at 2, McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (No. 72-490), 1973 WL 
159430, at *2. Plaintiff Green presented the question as follows: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred, in including among the standards it 
enunciated for the guidance of the District Court on remand the 
admonition that “in cases presenting questions of discriminatory hiring 
practices, employment decisions based on subjective, rather than objective, 
criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.” 
Brief for Respondent at 3, McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (No. 72-490), 1973 
WL 172024, at *3. Oddly, McDonnell Douglas spent this argument trying to 
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strengthening at-will employment.  The Court’s decision has 
several facets, including confining Griggs to disparate impact 
cases; formalizing the prima facie case of discrimination; 
resurrecting subjective reasons as legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory; clarifying the employer’s duty to rebut but 
not prove; and providing a link between the instant decision and 
the legislative history of Title VII.  All of these facets137 worked to 
reaffirm the Doctrine’s dominance.138 
establish that the “objectivity” rule usurped the provenance of the fact finder in 
cases where subjectivity of judgment was a key element of understanding the 
challenged decision. Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 34–39. It was in McDonnell 
Douglas’s argument challenging the prima facie case holding that McDonnell 
Douglas focused the Court on the danger of Title VII becoming a for-cause 
termination statute. Id. at 28–30. McDonnell Douglas argued that section 706(g) 
specifically ratifies at-will decision making in that section 706(g) preserved employer 
rights to make nondiscriminatory business decisions on any basis with or without 
job-relatedness. Moreover, McDonnell Douglas argued that section 706(g) had once 
required for-cause termination but had been amended, and in striking the for-cause 
portion, “any employer action would expressly be beyond the pale of the Act if taken 
‘for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion or 
national origin.’ ” Id. at 28–29. 
137 As discussed supra in Part III.B.1, the prima facie case was never a real 
problem, as the concept was well understood in the lower courts. One is therefore led 
to wonder about the relevance of that part of the Court’s decision. The race-baiting 
tenor of the petitioner’s brief may have had an impact. Id. at 17, 20–22. More likely, 
the discussion of the employer’s rebuttal case, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, 
and the fact that the employer has no burden of proof required the prima facie case 
as a counterpoint. Despite the race-baiting of McDonnell Douglas’s briefing, 
McDonnell Douglas raised a significant issue; the Eighth Circuit did not explain the 
need for its prima facie case formula. Id. at 17. In other words, what was the 
relevance, standing alone, of Green’s blackness? Although the Court largely adopted 
the Eighth Circuit’s formula, the Court did not use its McDonnell Douglas II opinion 
to answer the question either. It was not until four years after McDonnell Douglas 
II, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, that the Court used a 
footnote to begin explaining its reasoning for the prima facie case. 431 U.S. 324 
(1977). According to that decision, the point of the prima facie case was to exclude 
the following: 
[T]he two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might 
rely to reject a job applicant [are] an absolute or relative lack of 
qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of 
these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, 
to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one. 
Id. at 358 n.44. In 1978, the Court again discussed the function of the prima facie 
case without answering the original question: What is the relevance of race standing 
alone? In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the Court explained the prima facie 
case as “merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination. . . . And we are 
willing to presume [discrimination] largely because we know from our experience 
that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner.” 438 U.S. 
567, 577 (1978). The Furnco Court went on to say, “[W]e infer discriminatory animus 
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The Court commandeered the Eighth Circuit’s prima facie 
case formula.  In doing so, the Court addressed the issues of the 
employer’s burden of proof and the quality of the evidence an 
employer could rely on to avoid liability.  As described above, the 
Eighth Circuit created a prima facie case that allowed a claimant 
to establish actionable discrimination with no actual evidence of 
discrimination.139  That version of the prima facie case 
represented a powerful proxy for proof of discrimination once 
coupled with a requirement that the employer, arguably, prove 
an objective job-related reason for an adverse decision.  The 
Court appropriated the prima facie case but decoupled it from the 
other elements that made it so potent and potentially dangerous 
to the at-will employment doctrine.  The Court’s version of the 
prima facie case remained a proxy for discrimination,140 but a 
because experience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is 
more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible 
considerations.” Id. at 580. The only rational conclusion to draw from the Court’s use 
of “experience” and “common experience,” is a common experience with 
discrimination. See id. at 577. To determine the significance of race standing alone, 
the Court’s theory is that because employers overtly discriminated against blacks 
prior to Title VII, they continue to do so covertly after Title VII. Accordingly, one 
infers that race standing alone is the reason for an adverse employment action when 
a claimant establishes the other elements of the prima facie case. The importance of 
the prima facie case from this perspective is not that, as the Court has pointed out, it 
is easy to prove. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270 (1989) (“The prima 
facie case established there was not difficult to prove.”); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). The importance of the prima facie case was 
its potential for capturing covert discriminatory behavior, which might actually have 
made Title VII intolerant of any discrimination “subtle or otherwise.” McDonnell 
Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 801. 
138 As to the Eighth Circuit’s view that Griggs required all employment policies 
or practices to meet the objective job-relatedness standard, there is little to tell. The 
Court chose not to debate the point. By silently ignoring the issue, the Court made it 
go away. To assure distance between Griggs and the claimant in that case, the Court 
distinguished Griggs on its facts, including that all of the Griggs claimants were 
innocent victims and that Mr. Green was not. The Court in McDonnell Douglas II 
specifically distinguished Griggs because Griggs dealt with the disparate impact of 
standardized testing and the impermissibility of freezing blacks out of employment 
opportunities because of the continuing impacts of segregation. McDonnell Douglas 
II, 411 U.S. at 805–06. Moreover, the victims in Griggs had done nothing to deserve 
being excluded from employment opportunities. Id. Green presented a different 
picture because he engaged in illegal protest activity. Id. at 806. The distinction 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment after McDonnell Douglas II has 
been so clear that there are no Supreme Court cases reflecting an effort to tread that 
path again. 
139 McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 344. 
140 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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very fragile one.  Rather than a burden of proof, an employer 
would only have to rebut the prima facie case in order to destroy 
it,141 leaving the burden of proof with the claimant at all times142 
and as a final step, firmly saddling the claimant with the 
requirement to prove intentional discrimination based on a 
prescribed characteristic.143  On the issue of the quality of the 
employer’s rebuttal evidence, the Court implicitly commanded 
lower courts to defer to employers.144  Explicitly, the Court 
stamped what the Eighth Circuit and the parties called 
“subjective” evidence as perfectly legitimate when it stated, 
“[T]he [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the rebuttal 
weight to which [McDonnell Douglas’s] reasons were entitled.”145 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court tied its 
decision to Title VII’s legislative history, which affirmed the 
Doctrine’s dominant role.146  Legislative history validated the 
Court’s position on the rebuttal weight employer reasons should 
receive.  Without literally citing to the “management 
prerogatives” language, the Supreme Court created the 
paraphrase:  “There are societal as well as personal interests on 
both sides of this equation.  The broad, overriding interest, 
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially 
neutral employment and personnel decisions.”147 
141 Id. at 802–06. 
142 Id. at 805 (“In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair 
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid 
reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory 
decision.”); id. at 805 n.18 (“[Green] must be given a full and fair opportunity to 
demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his 
rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised.”). 
143 Id. at 805. 
144 Id. at 803–06. Examples of the Court’s implied guidance to defer to the 
employer’s reasons for adverse employment decisions include its discussion of an 
employer’s right to discharge employees for unlawful activity directed against an 
employer by striking employees under the NLRA and highlighting past conduct and 
past loyalty as part of the broader list of legitimate reasons for personnel decisions. 
145 Id. at 803. 
146 Id. at 803–04. 
147 Id. at 801. The criticism of McDonnell Douglas II as having no link to 
legislative history overlooks this key language. Yes, the Court added a third party—
the consumer—to the employer-employee relationship, which is confusing given the 
absence of any reference in the legislative history or the statute to a consumer-
protection purpose. The logical explanation for the failure of McDonnell Douglas’s 
critics to make the link is supplied by Professor Corbett’s proposition that this 
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The at-will employment doctrine appears in McDonnell 
Douglas II under the guise of a “broad, overriding interest, 
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, [in] efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially 
neutral employment and personnel decisions.”148  The statement 
reflects the restraint Title VII’s pivotal supporters required when 
they insisted that “management prerogatives, and union 
freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent 
possible”149 and that the “[i]nternal affairs of employers and labor 
organizations must not be interfered with except to the limited 
extent that correction is required in discrimination practices.”150  
In subsequent cases, the Court explicitly linked its McDonnell 
Douglas II jurisprudence to legislative history, clarifying the 
dominant role of the Doctrine on the Court and the Court’s belief 
that the Doctrine dominated congressional decision making as 
well.151 
There was never an “escalating subordination of . . . [Title 
VII] to employment at will.”152  In disparate treatment cases, 
arguably since 1965, certainly since 1973, Title VII has always 
been subordinate to employment-at-will.  Describing the 
relationship otherwise inaccurately suggests a status Title VII 
particular alias for employment-at-will made it hard to recognize. Corbett, The 
“Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 308. 
148 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 801. Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine quotes this passage from McDonnell Douglas II and explains it by 
invoking “management prerogatives.” 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
149 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
150 Id. 
151 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“Title VII eliminates 
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving 
employers’ freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer 
prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us.” (emphasis added)); id. at 
242 (“The statute’s maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute 
itself and from its history, both in Congress and in this Court.”); Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 259 (“[Title VII] was not intended to ‘diminish traditional management 
prerogatives.’ ” (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979))); 
Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 (“Title VII could not have been enacted into law without 
substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted 
federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for 
their support that ‘management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left 
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.’ ” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, 
at 29 (1963)) (alteration in original)).  
152 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 305, 311. 
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never actually possessed.153  The fact the Court regularly had to 
explain the meaning of McDonnell Douglas II in subsequent 
cases is not evidence of a resurgent at-will employment doctrine 
that had been suppressed.  Rather, it is evidence that individual 
decision makers in lower courts have not, or could not, assimilate 
Title VII’s limitations, or that litigants, usually claimants, 
refused to believe lower courts had gotten it right.154 
To a great degree, the Court must accept responsibility for 
any confusion about Title VII’s operative parameters in disparate 
treatment cases.  Griggs created the environment that required 
McDonnell Douglas II.155  McDonnell Douglas II contains the 
sweeping statement that Title VII tolerates no discrimination 
subtle or otherwise, yet gives employers back their right to 
engage in subjective decision making156—a well acknowledged  
 
 
153 The earliest Title VII scholars recognized its weakness. Richard Berg, for 
example, wrote: 
The enforcement procedures of the title, however, bear only too visibly the 
marks of compromise, and seem to me to contain serious deficiencies. It 
seems questionable that much can be accomplished through suits in federal 
court by persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination. The practical 
advantages will lie heavily with the defendants, and even where the 
evidence of discrimination is overwhelming, it cannot be expected that 
many complainants will undertake the burden of an individual suit. 
Berg, supra note 75, at 96–97; see also Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Title VII: Coverage 
and Comments, 7 B.C. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1966) (“And compliance with the letter 
[of Title VII]—both in terms of coverage and substance—may very well impose 
inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the continuation of practices 
which exclude Negroes from employment, but the legislation, as presently conceived, 
can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”). 
154 The failure of lower courts to heed McDonnell Douglas II arose from an 
unextinguished desire that the asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason be in 
some way objectively satisfactory. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 608 
F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979); Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 
1089 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 
1973)).  
155 Although the Court at some point was likely to face the question of when 
circumstantial evidence amounted to proof of intentional disparate treatment, as 
argued in this Article, there is an obvious causal relationship that required the 
Court to address the question in 1973; Griggs led the Eighth Circuit, contrary to 
legislative intent, to limit employer discretion in disparate treatment cases to 
objective criteria, which required the Court to restore employer discretion to the full 
scope envisioned by the Eighty-eighth Congress. 
156 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 803 (1973). 
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breeding ground for covert discrimination.157  Nevertheless, the 
Court, single-mindedly, has kept Title VII confined and at-will 
dominant. 
After McDonnell Douglas II, the Court in every other 
significant disparate treatment case reaffirmed at-will’s 
dominant status in three ways.  The Court conformed Title VII’s 
actual impact to Congress’s intention to eliminate only the worst 
forms of discrimination by formalizing the direct versus 
circumstantial evidence dichotomy.  In so doing, the Court left 
claims of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence easy 
prey to the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.158  The Court 
also regularly confirmed that in order to rebut the prima facie 
case and dispel any inference of discrimination, the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason must be asserted, not proved.159  
Finally, the Court confirmed the scope of management 
prerogatives as inclusive reasons that may not have been 
asserted, so long as the claimant failed to ultimately show that 
adverse employment action occurred because of a proscribed 
reason.160 
C. The Triumph of At-Will 
1. The Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence Dichotomy 
Discrimination proved by direct evidence is, by definition, 
one of the “most serious types of discrimination.”161  McDonnell 
Douglas II made direct evidence cases impossible for employers 
to win because an employer could not avoid an award of 
157 McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston 
Cnty. Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Courts have often 
observed that proof of overt racial discrimination in employment is seldom direct.” 
(citing United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 422 (5th Cir. 
1971))); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971); 
Holland v. Edwards, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1954). 
158 See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03; see also supra Part III.B. 
159 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03. 
160 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 
(1979). 
161 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963). Professor Michael Selmi has argued 
that the Court appears only to be able to see the most overt discrimination, but he 
does not offer a complete explanation for why the Court gives that appearance. It is 
true that the Court can only perceive the grossest forms of race discrimination. The 
reason why, at least under Title VII, is that it is all Congress intended the Court to 
perceive as actionable race discrimination. Selmi, supra note 6, at 324–28, 335. 
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meaningful compensation by asserting a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason.  Title VII’s affirmative purpose 
directed this outcome.162  Discrimination proved by any other 
means had to be balanced against Congressional intent to leave 
at-will in place.163  That is exactly what the Court achieved in 
McDonnell Douglas II.  The Court isolated discrimination based 
on circumstantial evidence and formalized the prima facie case 
as a proxy for intentional discrimination subject to the 
articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.164  The 
prima facie case is an eggshell.  The legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason is a fifty-pound sledgehammer.  
Disparate treatment cases like McDonnell Douglas II are 
supposed to be hard to win. 
2. The Fragility of the Prima Facie Case—The Return of “Any 
Reason or No Reason” 
It is axiomatic that the Court intended the prima facie case 
as a proplaintiff device.165  It was easy to prove because it 
provided a proxy for intentional discrimination in a world where 
direct evidence of discrimination was becoming increasingly hard 
to come by.166  Yet, as soon as an employer articulated a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of plausibility, 
the proxy for intentional discrimination disappeared.  If the 
McDonnell Douglas II Court’s purpose really was proplaintiff, 
why create such a fragile proxy for intentional discrimination? 
The fragility of the prima facie case cannot be explained by a 
single factor.  Part of the explanation lies in the Court’s need to 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence cases, 
which would thereby achieve Title VII’s actual purposes.167  
162 See supra Part III.A. 
163 Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 (“Title VII could not have been enacted into law 
without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally 
resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price 
for their support that ‘management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left 
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.’ ”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 
29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391). 
164 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03. 
165 William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1549, 1555 (2005); Corbett, Of Babies, supra note 14, at 377; Corbett, The 
“Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 332 n.134; McGinley, supra note 1, at 229. 
166 McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972). 
167 See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the direct versus circumstantial evidence 
dichotomy). 
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Another part of the explanation lies in the statutory requirement 
that a plaintiff prove intentional discrimination in order to 
receive meaningful relief.168  Thus, a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas II only creates a “legally mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption [of discriminatory intent].”169  It does not 
“describe the plaintiff’s burden of producing enough evidence to 
permit the trier of fact to infer [discriminatory intent].”170 
A proxy for intentional discrimination by definition cannot 
replace proof of intentional discrimination.  So, the prima facie 
case would have to be fragile by necessity in order to compel a 
plaintiff to actually prove the ultimate issue of an employment 
action due to discrimination because of race.  Another part of the 
explanation for the fragility of the prima facie case is its role in 
describing the limits of the at-will employment doctrine post-
Title VII.  Although this Article argues that, for practical 
purposes, in the absence of what would amount to direct evidence 
of discrimination, “any or no reason” continues to define the 
actual limits of employer discretion;  the prima facie case invites 
employers to publicly ascribe some nondiscriminatory reason to 
an adverse employment action.  In order to encourage employers 
to accept this invitation without risk to existing management 
prerogatives, the presumption of discrimination falls apart once a 
reason is given. 
a. “Any Reason”: The Articulation of a Legitimate 
Nondiscriminatory Reason and the Presumption of Legitimacy 
Although the Court in McDonnell Douglas II negated the 
Eighth Circuit’s effort to make the legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason as much like an affirmative defense as possible, the Court 
used ambiguous language to do so.  The Court’s lack of clarity 
spawned litigation to clarify the exact nature of the employer’s 
burden in disparate treatment cases.171  The Court in McDonnell 
Douglas II used the term “burden shifting,”172 but did not specify 
that the burden that shifted was one of production rather than 
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012). 
169 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). 
170 Id. 
171 See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 249–50; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 575–76 (1978); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 
24–25 (1978) (per curiam). 
172 See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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persuasion or proof.  Moreover, the use of the euphonious word 
“articulate” to describe the employer’s obligation to describe his 
reasoning had a significance of its own,173 but the Court also 
failed to focus on the significance of that word choice.  This lack 
of specificity and definition led to a failure to comprehend the 
true power of the mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory basis 
over a disputed employment action which, perhaps, ought to have 
been obvious because of the Court’s pronounced rejection of the 
need for an objective rationale for an adverse employment 
decision.  The Court’s coded message intended for lower courts to 
apply the “any reason” principle of at-will employment, 
prohibiting only those reasons proscribed by Title VII.174  A key 
piece of that message was that “any reason” really meant any 
reason, and the employer had no burden of proof or persuasion. 
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,175 the Court 
reinforced the McDonnell Douglas II message but again used 
inexact language to do so.  In Waters, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
because it was “haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective.”176  The 
Supreme Court responded with the at-will employment message 
of McDonnell Douglas II:  “Courts are generally less competent 
than employers to restructure business practices, and unless 
mandated to do so by Congress[,] they should not attempt it.”177  
In correcting the Seventh Circuit’s misunderstanding of the 
employer’s burden, the Court muddied the waters.  “[I]t is 
apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely 
that of proving that he based his employment decision on a 
legitimate consideration . . . . To prove that, he need not prove 
that he pursued the course which would both enable him to 
achieve his own business goal . . . .”178  The Seventh Circuit 
considered the goal to be the best hiring practices.179  Here, as  
with “articulate” in McDonnell Douglas II, the Court suggests the 
employer’s burden is not one of proof, but one of merely proving, 
despite the Court’s repeated use of prove and proving. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 438 U.S. 567. 
176 Id. at 578. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 577. 
179 Id. 
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In the very next term, the Court decided, per curiam, Board 
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney.180  This time, it was 
the First Circuit that confused the employer’s burden.  According 
to the First Circuit, on one hand, “in requiring the defendant to 
prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court [in 
McDonnell Douglas II] placed the burden squarely on the party 
with the greater access to such evidence.”181  On the other hand, 
the First Circuit accurately quoted the McDonnell Douglas II 
decision’s description of burden shifting:  “The burden then shifts 
to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case by showing that a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason accounted for its actions.”182  
Again, the Court affirmed the McDonnell Douglas II at-will 
message and failed to offer complete clarification: 
While words such as “articulate,” “show,” and “prove,” may have 
more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in 
which they are used, we think that there is a significant 
distinction between merely “articulat[ing] some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” and “prov[ing] absence of  
discriminatory motive.”  By reaffirming and emphasizing the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v. 
Waters . . . we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet 
the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination.183 
Sweeney focuses on the action of “merely articulating” in 
contrast to “proving.”  It confirms that “merely articulating” 
meets the employer’s burden.  But, in contrasting that action 
with “proving,” Sweeney made the important clarification that 
“merely articulating” was not “proving.”  
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,184 the 
Court finally fully described the employer’s burden to articulate a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.  For our purposes, Burdine 
is a reprise of Sweeney:  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals  
burdened the employer with proving the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason.185  This time, when the Court 
180 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam). 
181 Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
183 Id. at 25. 
184 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
185 Id. at 252. The Court’s problem with the Fifth Circuit’s decision is only 
somewhat more involved: 
The [Fifth Circuit] reaffirmed its previously announced views that the 
defendant in a Title VII case bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the existence of legitimate 
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described the burden shifting, it carefully limited the use of the 
words “proving” and “prove” to the plaintiff’s prima facie case and 
to pretext.186  With equal precision, the Court described the 
employer’s task.  “[I]f the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s 
rejection.’ ”187  Significantly, the Court clarified the power of 
merely articulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by 
stating, “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was 
actually motivated by the proffered reasons.”188 
In later cases, the Court reiterated that the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason need not be proved and need not be the 
actual reason.189  This proposition merely restates the at-will 
employment doctrine.  The Doctrine does not require an employer 
to justify its employment decisions at all.  In observance of that 
principle, an employer has no burden of proof in disparate 
treatment cases.  This conclusion is consistent with the 
legislative history and the text of Title VII.190  Moreover, if an 
employer gives any reason for an employment action, that reason 
is presumptively legitimate, even if it is not the actual reason.191  
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action and that the 
defendant also must prove by objective evidence that those hired or 
promoted were better qualified than the plaintiff. 
Id. 
186 Id. at 252–53. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with 
the plaintiff.” Id. at 253. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 254. 
189 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (Hicks II), 509 U.S. 502, 528–29 (1993); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278–79 (1989).  
190 See supra Part II. 
191 Here, we see the other incursion Title VII made into the dominion of at-will 
employment. Prior to Title VII, an employer’s unbridled discretion did not even 
admit the question, “Why?” After Title VII, an employer had an incentive to provide 
some answer. A detailed review of the prima facie case, discussed infra, fully maps 
the miniscule proportion of territory the at-will doctrine gave up to Title VII on this 
issue. Hopkins, however, provides additional refinement by defining the level of 
deference courts were to give to an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 290. Justice White hinted at the legitimacy presumption when 
he took the position that, even in the face of proven illegitimate considerations, an 
employer’s subjective view of the outcome in the absence of such considerations 
“should be ample proof.” Id. at 261. Justice O’Connor’s response to Justice White 
amplified the legitimacy of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 
According to Justice O’Connor, after a mixed-motives plaintiff shows that an 
illegitimate motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, “[t]he 
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This conclusion reaffirms the McDonnell Douglas II message:  
Courts are not to dispute the relative subjectivity or objectivity of 
the articulated nondiscriminatory business reason.192  Although 
there may be incentives for an employer to articulate the actual 
reason for any employment action,193 maximizing “existing 
management prerogatives” militates against any requirement 
that the reason be the actual reason.194  In the McDonnell 
Douglas II case, literally any reason is “entitled to the same 
presumption of good faith.”195 
b. “Or No Reason”: Hidden Legitimate Nondiscriminatory 
Reasons 
A complete discussion of the at-will employment doctrine’s 
domination of Title VII must deal with the second part of the 
traditional statement of the doctrine: “any reason, or no reason.”  
At first blush, McDonnell Douglas appears to prohibit an 
employer from escaping liability by remaining silent.  The 
apparent requirement that an employer articulate some reason 
for its decision seems meaningless if an employer asserts no 
reason.  That would be the case if burden shifting actually 
required an employer to state the actual reason for an adverse 
decision.  As described earlier in this Article, this is emphatically 
not required by McDonnell Douglas.  Moreover, consistent with 
the number of alter egos of at-will and coded messages from the 
employer has not yet been shown to be a violator, but neither is it entitled to the 
same presumption of good faith concerning its employment decisions which is 
accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Id. at 
265–66. The “presumption of good faith” described the true power of the presumptive 
legitimacy of the articulated reason regardless of subjectivity. See id. 
192 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973). 
193 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. 
194 In Hopkins, for example, Justice O’Connor took the position that an employer 
would never have to state or prove the actual reason, unless the employee proved its 
case by direct evidence. This position is in line with at-will primacy by creating a 
special subset of the very small number of direct evidence discrimination cases 
already isolated by McDonnell Douglas II. Within that subset, an employer can give 
up the complete freedom of at-will and accept the burden of proving an affirmative 
defense. The benefit to the employer of giving some ground on at-will in this specific 
circumstance is that, in the conflict between direct evidence of discrimination and 
proof of a true, legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment 
decision, the employee wins an injunction and the employer wins the financial 
victory. The point here is that mere articulation of a reason, which may or may not 
be true, is such a small diminution of the at-will prerogative that is literally 
meaningless. See supra Parts I, II. 
195 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 265–66. 
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Court, “or no reason” remained camouflaged within the pretext 
stage of McDonnell Douglas.  When the Court revealed the 
existence of the “no reason” half of the phrase in St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks196 (“Hicks II”), the Court reaffirmed that a 
court need not believe the articulated legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons and the employer need not have 
asserted the actual legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
decision.197 
It has been said that “Hicks reached a new level in the 
subordination of employment discrimination law.”198  To the 
contrary, Hicks II was foreshadowed in the Court’s Title VII 
jurisprudence.199  All of those decisions forthrightly state that the 
plaintiff has the burden to prove discrimination because of a 
proscribed characteristic.200  Anything less than that standard 
required a finding in favor of the employer because of the 
inherent limitations imposed on Title VII by the need to preserve 
the maximum extent of management prerogatives and the 
statute’s language limiting the recovery of meaningful relief to 
only those circumstances where any reason other than race was 
absent.  Hicks II, accordingly, served to limit Title VII to its place 
as a narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine.  From 
that perspective, Hicks II is hardly objectionable given the 
Court’s repeated although disguised admonition that the 
Doctrine dominates disparate treatment claims under Title VII.  
If Hicks II reached a new level, it was a new level of clarity. 
Hicks, a black prison guard at St. Mary’s Honor Center of 
the Missouri Department of Corrections, claimed his demotion 
and termination constituted disparate treatment under Title 
VII.201  The trial judge found that Hicks had proved his prima 
facie case; St. Mary’s had asserted two legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons, and Hicks had shown those reasons 
196 509 U.S. 502, 536–37 (1993). 
197 Id. at 509–10. 
198 Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 341. 
199 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas II restoration of at-
will employment by reversing the Eighth Circuit). 
200 See supra Part III.C.2.a (explaining Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567 (1978); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per 
curiam); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228). 
201 Hicks II, 509 U.S. at 504–05. 
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to be pretextual.202  The district court then proceeded to analyze 
the evidence under the McDonnell Douglas II decision’s third 
stage for proof, “that race was the determining factor in 
defendant’s decision.”203  Although the district court found ample 
evidence that the defendant “placed [Hicks] on the express track 
to termination,”204 Hicks did not prove that the termination “was 
racially rather than personally motivated.”205 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court.206  The Eighth 
Circuit took issue with the district court for assuming an 
unasserted reason for St. Mary’s action: that the motivation was 
personal rather than racial.207  Moreover, the court took the 
position that once Hicks, or any other defendants in this type of 
suit, proved that the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons were pretext, “defendants were in a position of having 
offered no legitimate reason for their actions.”208  Once a plaintiff 
proved, through pretext, that the defendant offered no legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason, a plaintiff also proved 
discrimination.209  In the context of the at-will employment 
doctrine, the Eighth Circuit’s implementation of McDonnell 
Douglas II represented a significant territorial acquisition for 
Title VII.  According to the Eighth Circuit, Title VII through 
McDonnell Douglas II modified the at-will employment doctrine 
such that “any reason” actually required the employer to state an 
ultimately persuasive reason, and “no reason” or silence, 
established either by literal silence or proof of pretext, did not 
survive.210 
202 Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(“Pretext is a statement that does not describe the actual reasons for the decision.” 
(citing Mister v. Ill. C.G.R. Co., 832 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987))). 
203 Id. at 1251. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1252. 
206 Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. (Hicks I), 970 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1992). 
207 Id. at 492. Showing that its thirst for objectivity was not dead, the Eighth 
Circuit even went so far as to question “whether such a hypothetical reason based 
upon personal motivation even could be stated and still be ‘legitimate’ and 
‘nondiscriminatory.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 493. 
210 Id. at 492. There is something Quixote-esque about the Eighth Circuit’s 
position. Hicks I appears to be a reprise of the Eighth Circuit’s McDonnell Douglas I 
effort to reimagine Title VII. For example, the conclusion that the legitimacy of the 
nondiscriminatory reason is contingent on its persuasiveness echoes the earlier 
quest for objective standards to justify an adverse employment action. The Eighth 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia corrected the Eighth 
Circuit’s misinterpretation of McDonnell Douglas II.  The circuit 
court erred in equating an incredible reason with no reason and 
silence.  According to Justice Scalia, rather than being in the 
same position they would have been had they remained silent, 
“[b]y producing evidence (whether ultimately persuasive or not) 
of nondiscriminatory reasons, [St. Mary’s] sustained their burden 
of production, and thus placed themselves in a ‘better position 
than if they had remained silent.’ ”211  This is true, as Justice 
Scalia explained, because the articulation of any reason dispelled 
the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie 
case.212 
A pretextual reason that amounts to no reason because it is 
unpersuasive is not the same as silence.  This kind of “no reason” 
equally dispels the prima facie case presumption because it is 
more accurately viewed as “no good reason” or a “bad reason.”  
Both of these conceptions of an incredible reason fall well within 
the acknowledged safe harbor of the presumptive legitimacy of 
“any reason.”  Accordingly, while a pretextual reason may allow a 
finding of discrimination, a pretextual reason does not compel a 
finding of discrimination because it does not necessarily show 
pretext for discrimination.213 
On its face, Hicks II seems only to clarify that proving 
pretext is not enough in every case to also prove discrimination.  
Only somewhat less transparently, Hicks II confirms that there 
was nothing problematic about the trial court finding that St. 
Circuit made this effort despite the Court’s specific statement in Texas Department 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine that “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court 
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
Moreover, showing a continuing thirst for invigorating Title VII with objective 
standards, the Eighth Circuit even went so far as to question “whether such a 
hypothetical reason based upon personal motivation even could be stated and still be 
‘legitimate’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’ ” Hicks I, 970 F.2d at 492 (emphasis omitted). 
This occurred in spite of the early recognition given to personality conflicts as a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and the Furnco Court’s sanctioning of 
“haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective” business reasons as legitimate under 
McDonnell Douglas II. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra Part I. 
211 Hicks II, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
212 Id. at 509–10. 
213 Id. at 511. In overcoming some awkward language from Burdine, Justice 
Scalia clearly described the pretext issue as one of being pretext for discrimination, 
which can only be shown if the reason for the adverse decision was false and if the 
true reason was discrimination. Id. at 515–16. 
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Mary’s hid, through pretextual reasons, the actual reason for 
Hicks’s termination: personality conflict.  If one accepts that the 
action of articulating incredible reasons and remaining silent as 
to the actual reasons amounts to no reason, then St. Mary’s 
escaped liability by giving no reason for Hicks’s termination.  
This concept gave Justice Scalia not the least bit of trouble.  
Responding to the argument that allowing a reason to remain 
hidden, “lurking in the record,”214 until discovered by a trial court 
unfairly hamstrung a plaintiff, Justice Scalia wrote, “It makes no 
sense.”215  The fallacy of that argument resides in the notion that 
a plaintiff must only refute articulated reasons under McDonnell 
Douglas II.216  To the contrary, “Title VII does not award 
damages against employers who cannot prove a 
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but 
only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse 
employment action by reason of . . . race.”217  In other words, the 
requirement of proof of actual discrimination leaves “no reason” a 
vibrant attribute of the dominant at-will paradigm. 
The question remains whether it is possible for an employer 
to literally assert “no reason” by remaining silent in a disparate 
treatment case.  The answer is maybe.  Although the prima facie 
case is just a proxy for intentional discrimination, wisdom 
dictates the proxy’s destruction by the articulation of a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason.  On the other hand, the failure to 
rebut the prima facie case still leaves the plaintiff with only a 
proxy for, but not proof of, intentional discrimination.  Under 
Hicks II, a plaintiff with only a proxy for intentional 
discrimination is in no better position than a plaintiff with only 
proof of pretext:  Neither is entitled to a finding of intentional 
discrimination as a matter of law. 
Employers’ continued articulation of legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons symbolizes Title VII’s conquest of that 
much of the Doctrine’s territory domain;  employers now believe 
that they must offer an explanation for an adverse employment 
decision.  The value of this belief as a symbol of Title VII’s 
triumph, however, must be judged against the legitimate 
214 Id. at 523. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 523–24. Although Justice Scalia did not cite to the statute for this 
statement, it is the substance of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012). 
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nondiscriminatory reasons’ power to trigger the summary 
dismissal of a disparate treatment claim.  In that regard, the 
Doctrine has taken on a new alias, and employers remain as 
empowered as ever. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to be disillusioned with the Court’s apparent 
mismanagement of one of the civil rights era’s landmarks.  
Among others, the Court is at fault for the disillusionment.  The 
Court, for example, told us, “Title VII tolerates no discrimination, 
subtle or otherwise.”218  We chose to believe that statement.  We 
also chose to believe that fifty years ago, something truly ground 
breaking occurred when the moral principle of equality became 
imbedded in federal law.  Fifty years on, we need to make other 
choices.  Mainly, we need to resist the urge to superimpose 
purposes on Title VII that the Eighty-eighth Congress never 
intended and therefore never built into Title VII.  Congress’s 
purpose for Title VII was the ending of the worst forms of 
discrimination and the preservation of the Doctrine.  Since Title 
VII’s purpose was not the eradication of all forms of employment 
discrimination, the Court, therefore cannot be at fault for 
reflecting Title VII’s limited purpose in McDonnell Douglas II.  
There are no fixes for Title VII.  It does the work it was designed 
to do under the Court’s accurate stewardship.  The Doctrine 
remains dominant.  Since the Doctrine has always dominated 
Title VII, if there is a fix to be found, focusing on the Doctrine 
and its role in antidiscrimination law seems like a good place to 
start fixing antidiscrimination law. 
 
218 McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
